We consider the adaptive learning rule of Harley (1981) for behavior selection in symmetric conflict games in large populations. The rule uses organisms' past, accumulated rewards as the predictor for the future behavior, and can be traced in many life forms from bacteria to humans. We derive a partial differential equation (PDE) that describes the stochastic learning in a population of agents. The equation has simple structure of the "conservation of mass"-type equation in the space of stimuli to engage in a particular type of behavior. We analyze the solutions of the PDE model for typical 2x2 games. It is found that in games with small residual stimuli, adaptive learning rules with faster memory decay have an evolutionary advantage.
Introduction
Natural selection is a mechanism for selecting a fittest behavioral trait in a population of organisms. A mathematical model introduced by Manyard Smith & Price (1973) formalizes this mechanism in the situation when each individual consistently uses one of the available behavioral traits t 1 , ..,t k to interact with other members, and no mutations take place. In this model the choice of the behavior (action) is inherited, and the population consists of groups that use a particular behavior. Over a long period of time, involving large number of interactions, the average fitness per game for individuals using t i , denoted by W i , is compared to the population average fitnessW , and the individuals in t i -group are reproduced at rate proportional to W i /W. When the population is large, and the changes in the frequencies of t i are approximately continuous Taylor & Joniker (1978) , Zeeman (1981) derived the replicator dynamics equations for the frequencies m i of individuals acting according to t i : dm i dt = km(W i −W )/W, i = 1..N.
Asymptotically stable fixed points of this system of equations correspond to outcomes of the natural selection in a polymorphic population. A notion of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) was introduced in Manyard Smith & Price (1973) to describe stable outcomes of the natural selection, by defining them as being uninvadable by pure or mixed strategies players. Considered from the point of view of the Game Theory, an evolutionary stable strategy is a refinement of the Nash equilibria (ESS is in between of strict Nash and Nash equilibrium), which represents the "rational" choice of actions in games. In this way, the natural selection is a mechanism for implementing a rational decision making in the evolution of species. There is another way by which organisms, even without complex cognition, can discover the optimal behavior. It can be achieved through their ability to regulate behaviors depending on the changing conditions. One of the postulates of the Theory of Reinforcement and Choice Behavior is the strong correlation between the response rate for a particular action and a) the reinforcement rate; b) the value of reinforcement; and c) the delays of reinforcement for this action, see Domjan & Burkhard (1986) . The postulate summarizes the numerous findings from the the experimental studies of reinforcement in animals and humans, see Ferster & Skinner (1957) , Herrnstein (1961) , Herrnstein (1970), Catania (1963) Chung & Herrnstein (1967), Roth & Erev (1995) , Erev & Roth (1998) . Harley (1981) proposed the relative payoff sum (RPS) as a simple decision making rule that implements the numerous experimental findings in this field. The RPS learning rule assumes the ability of organism to maintain a record of cumulative rewards from previous experiences, which at epoch t is given by vector S(t) = (S 1 (t), .., S k (t)). S(t) is the predictor for the future behavior and can be interpreted as a vector of "motivations" or "stimuli" to engage in a corresponding action. From the current stimuli an agent computes the probability to play t i :
.
If action t i 0 is chosen and it brings payoff P i 0 (t), then stimuli are updated according to the rule
and for k = i 0 ,
Positive parameter µ expresses memory effect: payoff P i (t − n) from n previous plays will appear with the weight (1 − µ) n+1 in the expression for S i (t + 1). Parameters r i 's stay for some default levels of stimuli S i . They represent the genetic preference for the action. They are also the stimuli that an agent would have in a long run of games that has resulted in zero payoffs. The question then arises which strategy, if any, will be learned by organisms implementing RPS rule. Harley (1981) presented numerical simulations of learning in several 2x2 games that showed that RPS in general leads to the discovery of the optimal strategies. The goal of this paper is to address the question of behavior of RPS learning organisms in large populations by approximating the stochastic process of learning by deterministic mean-field type differential equations that provides a simple, descriptive picture of the process.
Unlike the evolutionary dynamics framework, RPS learning organisms can not be identified with some particular strategy they use all the time. RPS rule will in general prescribe new strategy every time an agent plays. In the situations like this, the natural quantity to describe the state of agents is a distribution of agents according to their current stimuli. In large populations, the probability density function of this distribution can be approximated by continuous function and its changes can be described by a non-linear Fokker-Planck-type equation. The derivation of the equation contained in the Appendix of this paper. Among the assumptions needed for the derivation of the equation are: the large population size, large number of plays of the game, and incremental (infinitesimal) structure payoffs in each play of the game.
After the derivation of the equations we apply them to determine the behavior of RPS learners in typical 2x2 games. We confirm some of the known results, for example, the convergence of the learning process without memory decay to a single Nash equilibrium. Other results, such as the learning dynamics in the model with memory decay and estimates of the convergence rate, are new.
The Model
We consider a series of plays of a game between randomly selected species in a large population. The payoff matrix of the game is given in the table 1. The C D C (ah, ah) (dh, ch) D (ch, dh) (bh, bh) behaviors are labeled, for definiteness, C (cooperate) and D (defect). We will analyze the RPS learning in the games that a) have a single pure Nash equilibrium with a > c, d > b (or a < c, d < b ); b) two Nash equilibria with a > c, b > d; and c) mixed Nash equilibrium when a < c, d > b. In our model there a group of N individuals where each individual is characterized by vector X t i = (S t i,1 , S t i,2 ) representing the accumulated stimuli to play C and D, respectively, at epoch t.
Suppose that two agents i and j are selected at random to play the game. Agents play with the probabilities to cooperate S t 1,i /(S t 1,i + S t 2,i ) and S t 1, j /(S t 1, j + S t 2, j ), for agent i and agent j, respectively. Denote the outcomes (C,C), (C,D), (D,C), (D,D), where the first is the action chosen by agent i. As the result of the interaction agent i increments his/her states according to the rule
and symmetrically for agent j. (r 1 , r 2 ) are the residual stimuli and µ ≥ 0 the parameter of the fading memory. Then, time moves to the next epoch t + δ and the process is reiterated. At time t = 0 agents have some, in general different, initial levels of stimuli to cooperate and defect.
Stimuli-space
Our main interest is in the distribution function (PDF) f (x,t) of agents in the stimuli-space x = (s 1 , s 2 ), s 1 , s 2 ≥ 0. In this space the straight lines through the origin represent the sets of stimuli of constant probability to cooperate when agent is playing a mixed strategy. The probability m related to the slope k as m = (1 + k) −1 so that the stimuli with preference for C are located closer to the s 1axis. For any subset Ω in the stimuli space, Ω f (x,t) dx represents the proportion of agents with their stimuli in the set Ω at time t.
The following equation is found to be a leading order approximation for the process, when parameters h, δ are small and the number of players is large.
and velocity u
The analysis of the equation can be understood from the behavior of the system of ODEs:
and the equation form(t) that follows from (4):
Velocity u represents the rates of change of the stimuli of agents whose current state is given by x. The rates are proportional to the group average payoffs for corresponding actions, and "penalized" by memory for large deviations from the default residual levels (r 1 , r 2 ). Equation (7) is convenient for analyzing the games with pure Nash equilibrium. For the game with a mixed equilibrium, described by the frequency m * to play C, more convenient is equation
The nonlinear equation (4) is the first order approximation of the stochastic, learning process. The next order approximation contains a diffusion term, with the diffusion coefficients of order h. The diffusion generally prevents the convergence of learning of the group to a single strategy (fixation). When learning takes the system to increasingly large values of stimuli, the effects of diffusion will be negligible.
First we consider models with no memory decay, µ = 0.
Pure Nash equilibrium
Let a > c and d > b. The characteristic property of this regime is the positive sign ofm (t) in equation (7), for any distribution function f . This reflects the fact that action C is your best choice, no matter what your opponent does.
It is shown in Appendix thatm(t) increases to its maximum value 1 and the support of function f is transported to infinity along the trajectories of ODE (6) . In particular the stimuli of all agents, for large values of t will be located below any straight line of positive slope through the origin. That is, asymptotically all agents learn to play the equilibrium strategy "always C". The inclusion the second-order effects does not change the asymptotic picture.
Mixed Nash equilibrium
Let a < c and d > b. The equilibrium mixed strategy is m * = d−b c−a+d−b and the group average probability to play C evolves according to equation (8) .
It is shown in Appendix that the dynamics of equation (4) implies thatm(t) converges to the equilibrium density m * . The population average probability to play C asymptotically coincides with the Nash equilibrium m * . Unlike the pure Nash equilibrium case, here, agents keep playing with different strategies. This can be seen from the following example. If the initial data f 0 (x) describes the population of agents playing different strategies and is such that
then the trajectories of the flow generated by u are straight lines and for any t > 0,
Clearly, for all t, there is non-diminishing spread in the distribution function f (x,t). To put it differently, there is no learning when the group average probability to play C equals m * , because players expected payoffs from C and D are equal.
Two Nash equilibria
For this type of game a > c and d < b. Denote by m * = b−d a−c+b−d . As in the previous case, the group average probability to play C evolves according to equation (8) . If the initial datam(0) > m * velocity carries f to values of stimulus values of s 1 much larger than s 2 . As the averagem(t) increases, the dynamics is consistent and leads to learning of the Nash equilibrium C. Withm(0) < m * learning converges to the other equilibrium. In the borderline casem(0) = m * , is unstable: stimuli increase along the straight lines, and agents retain their initial probabilities to play C and D, but any perturbations will deviate the system to C or D equilibrium.
Memory decay RPS
Consider now models with µ > 0. It can be seen from equation (5) that a sufficiently large box [0,ŝ 1 ] × [0,ŝ 2 ] is invariant under the flow of (6) . We show in Appendix that with residuals r 1 , r 2 > 0, RPS learning will approach an asymptotically stable point in the stimuli space, for any positive payoff rates a, b, c, d. All agents will tend to play a mixed strategy m * = s * 1 s * 1 +s *
2
. When (C,C) is a Nash equilibrium, the ratio of stimuli s * 1 /s * 2 > r 1 /r 2 , and agents favor action C after learning more than at their default levels.
There is an interesting limiting case of zero residuals r 1 = r 2 = 0. For such RPS models, when the game has C as the Nash point, all agents learn this optimal strategy, as function f (x,t) converges to a delta mass supported at the point (a/µ, 0).
In this case, the equation for meanm(t) is closely approximated by the replicator dynamics equation (10) given below. The factor (s 1 (t) + s 2 (t)) −1 on the right-hand side of that equation, in this case, is of order 1. The convergence to the optimal strategy is faster than in the case of learning with perfect memory (µ = 0), for which the factor is of the order (1 + t) −1 . In fact the learning period is shorter for larger values of µ, see figure 2 and explanations in Appendix. Thus it appears that RPS models with small residuals and large values of µ should be preferred by natural selection. In such models agents act predominantly on the basis of the last few payoffs. In this context it is worth mentioning that one of the postulates of the Prospect Theory of Kahneman & Trverski (1984) , is the statement that people actions (in games with monetary payoffs) are directed by the increase in their total wealth, rather than the total accumulated wealth, which shows a preference for short memory and suggests that RPS learning might be at work.
Relation to the Replicator Dynamics Equation (RDE)
If one postulates that all agents have the same, or approximately the same, stimuli
for some s 1 (t), s 2 (t), so that f (s,t) is represented by a delta function supported at (s 1 (t), s 2 (t)), then equation (4), leads to a variant of the replicator dynamics equation for the probability to cooperate m(t) = s 1 (t)/(s 1 (t) + s 2 (t)) :
Notice the positive factor on the right-hand side of the equation. For a learning processes in which stimuli increase the learning rate slows down. The extent to which hypothesis (9) is consistent with the dynamics of (6) is limited only to the cases when the latter has a single asymptotically stable fixed point.
Summary
We analyzed the RPS learning rule for generic values of parameters, using the mean field approximation of the stochastic learning process with infinitesimal increments. It was established that rules with memory decay converge to the equilibrium of a 2x2 symmetric game faster than rules with "perfect memory". For the rules with memory decay the characteristic time of convergence is of the order µ −1 . Thus none of them is an evolutionary stable (ES) learning rule, in the sense of Harley (1981) . The RPS model with zero memory, (µ = 1 in (1), (2)), on the other hand, will not let organisms discover the optimal behavior. It appears that an ES learning rule must have some memory, but shorter than the memory of the RSP rules.
Appendix: PDE models

Fokker-Planck equation
Consider a group of N individuals acting according to RPS learning rule described in section 2. Denote by X t = (X t 1 , .., X t N ), where X t i = (S t 1,i , S t 2,i ), the vector of stimuli for all members at epoch t, By w h (x,t), where x ∈ [0, 1] 2N , we denote PDF for distribution of X t . We will writex = (x 1 , ..x N ), where each x i = (s 1,i , s 2,i ). The probability to cooperate will be denoted as λ i = s 1,i /(s 1,i + s 2,i ).
Suppose that member i and j are selected for the interaction. There will be only one game played during the period from t to t + δ . The matrix of payoffs is described in table 1. The range of parameters δ , h, N will be restricted later on.
Conditioned on the event X t =x, the agent probabilities for the next period are set according to the RPS rule (3), which in the notation of the stochastic process are
and symmetrically for X t+δ j . For all other agents, X t+δ k = X t k for k = i, j. The definition of X t makes it a discrete-time Markov process. We proceed by writing down the integral form of the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations and approximate its solution by a solution of the Fokker-Planck equation (forward Kolmogorov's equation), for small values of δ , h and large N. The method is well documented and can be found in many textbooks, for example, in the book of Feller (1957) . A similar method has been used recently to obtain a PDE model for the evolutionary selection by a Moran process, by Traulsen, Claussen & Hauert (2005) .
Change of w h (x,t) from t to t + δ , can be described in the following way. This equation can be written in slightly different way:
The above equation can be used to obtain 2N-dimensional ODE approximation of the stochastic process by evaluating lim h→0 E[X t+h | X t ] − X t /h = F(X t ). This approach was implemented in the method of stochastic approximation developed by Benaim-Hirsch (1999) and applied to the study of convergence of stochastic fictitious play processes. The method guarantees the convergence of the process X t under certain stability conditions for the dynamics of the associated ODE.
The large dimension of that dynamical system is an obstacle for further analysis. In contrast, we would like to obtain an equation for the distribution of large number N of agents in 2-dimensional stimuli space. For this, denote the PDF of the distribution by
wherex k is a 2N − 2 dimensional vector of all coordinates, excluding x k . In statistical physics this function is also called one-particle distribution. In the formulas to follow we need to use two-particle distribution function
wherex i j is the 2N − 4 dimensional vector of all coordinated excluding x i and x j . Function g h is symmetric in (x, y) and is related to f h by the formulas f h (x,t) = g h (x, y,t) dx = g h (x, y,t) dy.
The moments of function f h and g h are computed from the moment of w h :
This follows from the definition of these functions. Now we use (12) to obtain an integral equation of the change of function f h . For that select φ (x) = ψ(x k ), sum over k and take average. We get
The right-hand side can be conveniently expressed in terms of the two-particle function g h :
where x = (s x 1 , s x 2 ), y = (s y 1 , s y 2 ), and λ (x) = s x 1 /(s x 1 + s x 2 ), and similar for λ (y). In the processes with large number of agents and random binary interactions, twoparticle distribution function can be factored into two independent distributions:
With this relation, (14) , becomes a family of non-linear integral relations for the next time step distribution f h (x,t + δ ). Selecting time step proportional to h so that 2h δ N ∼ 1, and taking Taylor expansions up to the first order for the increment of the test function ψ, we obtain the following Fokker-Planck equation
where x = (s 1 , s 2 ), s 1 , s 2 > 0 and the drift velocity is given by the formula
,
Consider now the learning from playing a symmetric n × n game. Let the payoff to playing i th action against j th be equal to a i j h. Denote the stimulus vector x = (s 1 , .., s n ), and the population average probability to play i bȳ
The first-order approximation of the RPS learning process is given by the Fokker-
on the domain with s i ≥ 0, i = 1..n. In this equation, the velocity vector u = (u 1 , .., u n ) is given by its components
Now we consider in some detail the learning in 2x2 games. Much of the analysis of equation (15) is derived from the behavior of trajectories of ODE (6) . The solution f of (15) is obtained by transporting the support of f 0 along trajectories of the dynamical system (6) and changing the values f 0 so that the "mass" (measured by the density function f ) of any "fluid element" remains constant. In fact on can write down the formula for f in terms of u and prove that the solution f of the non-linear problem exists and unique. This can be done by standard methods of PDEs, but it is outside of the scope of the present paper. Here, we will be interested in the long time, qualitative asymptotic for f (x,t).
Equation (15) is considered in the first quadrant s 1 , s 2 > 0. For µ = 0, the boundary of the domain in invariant under the flow of (6) . For the model with fading memory, µ > 0, the velocity u at the boundary is directed into the flow domain. In either case, we will assume that the function f 0 (x) is zero on the boundary. Then, this property will hold for all t > 0. Additionally, in all of the analysis below, we assume that f 0 is a continuously differentiable function with compact support (zero outside some bounded set).
In the case of the pure Nash equilibrium (a > c, d > b) and no memory effects, µ = 0, the origin is a single fixed point. It is an unstable node with two positive eigenvalues; the eigenvalue corresponding to s 1 -direction is the dominant one. From the phase portrait of the ODE it is clear that the flow transports the support of f into the region where s 1 s 2 , which correspond to the case of all agents asymptotically in t adopting choice C in the game.
In the case of the mixed Nash equilibrium (a < c, d > b) and no memory effect, µ = 0, the origin is still an unstable node. Whenm(t) = m * then two positive eigenvalues coincide, and all trajectories are straight lines through the origin. In general, however,m(t) = m * , if for example they are not equal at time t = 0. In such cases equation (8) can be used to show that lim t→∞m (t) = m * . Indeed, notice that for any (x,t), |u(x,t)| < C for some C depending on the data of the problem. Then for any x such that f (x,t) = 0, there a constant C such that |x| < C(1 + t), because the support of f 0 is compact. Moreover, when the eigenvalues are close to each other, for all x such that f (x,t) = 0, one has s 2 /s 1 > c > 0, for moderate values of t. With that one can estimate the integral from (8) as
for some constant C > 0. With this estimate, one can solve form(t) − m * and conclude that
for some α 0 > 0. The learning of the optimal strategy m * will take place asymptotically. Consider now the model with the memory decay when µ > 0 and residuals r 1 , r 2 > 0. For any value ofm(t) ∈ [0, 1] and any set of positive parameters of the game a, b, c, d > 0 the right-hand side of (6) has a single fixed point (s 0 1 (t), s 0 2 (t)) in the interior of the first quadrant, with s 0 1 > r 1 , s 0 2 > r 2 , and this point is an asymptotically stable node.
The mass f (x,t) moves in the direction of the fixed point, contracting in size. In a long run the fixed point will settle at x * = (s * 1 , s * 2 ) and f (x,t) will be a deltafunction supported at that point. The point is a fixed point of the velocity u, wherē m(t) is computed from (16) with f supported at x * . That is, x * is a solution of the equations
In this process the agents learn mixed strategy m * = s * 1 /(s * 1 + s * 2 ). A special case of zero residuals r 1 = r 2 = 0 deserves a discussion. In the limit of zero residuals r 1 , r 2 → 0, in (17) x 0 = (a/µ, 0) and x 1 = (0, b/µ). When a > c, d > b, the former, corresponding to the strategy "always C", is an asymptotically stable node and latter, corresponding to "always D", is a saddle, see figure 1 . Thus, the agents with memory decay and zero residual levels do learn the optimal strategy and because the learning occurs in the bounded region of the stimuli space, the convergence to the equilibrium is faster than the case of learning with perfect memory µ = 0. Using equation (10) we can also estimate on the rate of convergence as a function of µ. The rate is proportional to µ implying that the characteristic time of convergence to be C/µ. Figure 2 shows the simulations of the stochastic process in this regime for different values of µ. It shows that the prediction based on the model (15) is in good agreement with the stochastic learning process. We conclude that models with low residuals and high µ perform better in learning the optimal strategy in 2x2 games and thus more likely to evolve in the natural selection.
Second order effects
The inclusion of the next order approximation into consideration adds a diffusion term into equation (15) with the diffusion coefficients proportional to h. In the problems where the drift velocity takes f to regions with large values of x, as 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8. Figure 2 : Learning time to equilibrium in the game with a=3, b=1, c=d=2, h=0.01, N=100 and µ ranging from 0.5 to 10 with increment of 0.5. All agents have stimuli (1,1) at the beginning of the process. Learning time is a time it takes for at least 90% of population to have probabilities to play C in the range [0.9,1]. Each learning time is the average over 20 simulations. Units of time are arbitrary. The line plot is the best fit to the data points by function c 0 µ −1 . The figure was generated using MatLab R2017b software.
in the case of the pure or mixed Nash equilibrium, diffusion will have a marginal effect.
In the problems with asymptotically stable fixed points in stimuli space (short memory models) diffusion will create a stationary distribution of f near the fixed point, preventing all agents to adopt a single strategy.
